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7.  Terrorist Content and the Social Media 
     Ecosystem: The Role of Regulation
Patrick Bishop, Stuart Macdonald 
Two months after the two attacks on mosques in Christchurch, 
New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, and French 
President, Emmanuel Macron brought together Heads of State 
and Government and leaders from the tech sector to adopt the 
Christchurch Call. Among the commitments listed in the call 
was a pledge from the Governments to “Consider appropri-
ate action to prevent the use of online services to disseminate 
terrorist and violent extremist content”, including “Awareness-
raising and capacity-building activities aimed at smaller online 
service providers” and “Regulatory or policy measures consist-
ent with a free, open and secure internet and international hu-
man rights law”1.
On the same day, a consortium of technology companies – 
including Amazon, Facebook, Google, Twitter and Microsoft – 
released a list of nine steps it would take to “address the abuse of 
technology to spread terrorist content”2. These included both 
individual actions (such as continued investment in technology 
to improve detection and removal of terrorist and violent ex-
tremist content) and collective actions (such as working across 
1 https://www.christchurchcall.com/call.html (last retrieved on 12 July 2019). 
2 GIFCT, Actions to Address the Abuse of  Technology to Spread Terrorist and 
Violent Extremist Content, 15 May 2019 (last accessed 12 July 2019); Amazon, 
Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and twitter, Joint Statement in Support of  
Christchurch Call (last retrieved on 12 July 2019). 
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industry, governments, and NGOs to create crisis protocols). 
The Christchurch Call is the latest in a number of efforts in 
recent years to require social media companies to do more to 
ensure that terrorist content is removed from their platforms. 
In 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for 
a new Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terror-
ist content online3. Aiming to balance the swift and effective 
detection and removal of terrorist content with the protection 
of human rights, Article 3 of the Regulation proposes the crea-
tion of a general duty for hosting services to “take appropriate, 
reasonable and proportionate actions […] against the dissem-
ination of terrorist content and to protect users from terrorist 
content”. Article 4 proposes the introduction of a removal or-
der. This could be issued either administratively or judicially 
and would oblige the relevant platform to remove the content 
within one hour4. 
A year earlier, in 2017, Germany passed its Network 
Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”). This applies to all for-profit so-
cial media platforms with at least two million registered users 
in Germany. The NetzDG law requires platforms to remove or 
block obviously illegal content within 24 hours and to decide 
on all other complaints within one week5. Fines of up to €50 
million can be imposed in cases involving systematic breaches 
of the law6.
The introduction of a similar law has also been approved by 
the French National Assembly and is currently awaiting consid-
eration by the Senate7. 
3 European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council on preventing the dissemination of  terrorist content online”, 
2018/0331 (COD), 2018.
4 Article 18 provides that member states should lay down the penalties for 
non-compliance.
5 W. Echikson and O.  Knodt, Germany’s NetzDG: A key test for combatting online hate, 
CEPS Research Report, 2018.
6 Section 4(2) of  NetzDG invokes section 30(2) of  the Act on Regulatory Offences, 
which states that the maximum regulatory fine may be multiplied by ten. 
7 Agence France-Presse, “France online hate speech law to force social media 
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In the UK, meanwhile, in April 2019 the Government pro-
posed the creation of a new independent regulatory body in its 
Online Harms white paper. The regulator would enforce a new 
statutory duty of care on relevant companies to take reasona-
ble steps to keep their users safe and tackle illegal and harmful 
activity on their services, with a range of enforcement options 
including the imposition of fines8.
Against this backdrop, the starting point for this chapter is 
not whether regulatory measures should be imposed that require 
social media companies to do more to remove terrorist content 
from their platforms, but what form such measures should take. 
The chapter will argue, first, that a diverse regulatory toolkit is 
essential. There is no one-size-fits-all regulatory intervention. 
Whilst public discourse has tended to focus on the imposition 
of fines, other measures such as capacity-building, removal or-
ders and the disruption of business activities (e.g. removal from 
search engine results and ISP blocking) are also necessary. 
Second, the chapter will argue that efforts to regulate social 
media companies must be responsive to a range of factors, in-
cluding the company’s size and the extent of its engagement 
with the regulator. The benefits of responsive regulation are 
well-established and have been discussed extensively in academ-
ic literature9.
Third, in order to ensure responsivity, the regulatory toolkit 
should be arranged in a pyramid structure, where each layer 
of the pyramid consists of sanctions of increasing severity. The 
underlying logic is that regulated entities will be more likely 
to engage with the less draconian interventions at the base of 
the pyramid when faced with the prospect of escalation and 
increasingly severe penalties. 
sites to act quickly”, The Guardian, 9 July 2019.
8 HM Government, Online Harms White Paper, The Stationery Office, 2019.
9 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992; J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice 
and Responsive Regulation, New York, Oxford University Press.
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The chapter accordingly proposes the following enforcement 
pyramid:
At the bottom are advice, guidance and referrals. These strat-
egies seek to support companies’ efforts to self-regulate their 
platforms. For companies that fail to do so, the next layers of 
the pyramid are removal orders and, in the event of breach of a 
removal order, fines. At the top of the pyramid are disruption of 
business activities and, as a last resort, ISP blocking.
The chapter begins by explaining that efforts to remove on-
line terrorist content must target the whole of the social media 
ecosystem, not just the social media giants. Having shown how 
terrorist groups exploit smaller platforms in order to ensure 
relatively stable access to their propaganda, the chapter then 
discusses three types of company in turn: the social media gi-
ants; smaller companies that lack the capacity to regulate their 
platforms effectively; and, smaller companies that lack the will-
ingness to do so. 
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The Social Media Ecosystem
Before the Christchurch attacks, the attacker uploaded his 
manifesto to a range of smaller file-sharing sites (including 
MediaFire, ZippyShare and Solidfiles). Shortly before the first 
attack, he went onto Facebook, Twitter and 8chan and posted 
links to the copies of his manifesto available on these file-shar-
ing sites. The post on 8chan also included a link to his Facebook 
profile, through which he livestreamed the attack10. Facebook 
has reported that the video was viewed fewer than 200 times 
during the live broadcast11. The first user report on the original 
video arrived 29 minutes after the video started, and 12 minutes 
after the live broadcast ended, by which time a user on 8chan 
had already posted a link to a copy of the video on a file-sharing 
site12. The video was subsequently shared on YouTube, as well as 
smaller platforms LiveLeak, BitChute and Kiwifarms, and as a 
downloadable file on Torrentz. Further links to the attack were 
re-shared on Facebook, Reddit, and 8chan. Whilst most of the 
smaller platforms reacted responsibly, some did not and still 
have active links to the video and manifesto13.
Facebook has stated that, in the 24 hours after the attack, it 
blocked more than 1.2 million videos of the attack at upload14. 
A further 300,000 copies were removed after they were posted. 
One of the reasons why these additional copies were not detect-
ed by Facebook’s image and video matching technology was the 
proliferation of different variants of the video: more than 800 
“visually-distinct variants” were in circulation15. Some of these 
were the product of “a core community of bad actors working 
10 Tech Against Terrorism, “Analysis: New Zealand attack and the terrorist use 
of  the internet”, 26 March 2019 (last retrieved on 12 July 2019).
11 G. Rosen, “A Further Update on New Zealand Terrorist Attack”, Facebook 
News, 20 March 2019 (last retrived on 12 July 2019).
12 Ibid.
13 Tech Against Terrorism (2019). 
14 G. Rosen, A Further Update on New Zealand Terrorist Attack..., cit.
15 Ibid.
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together to continually re-upload edited versions of this video 
in ways designed to defeat our detection”16.
The dissemination of the Christchurch attack video has simi-
larities with IS (Islamic State)’s propaganda dissemination strat-
egy. In the past five years IS’s presence on Twitter has greatly 
diminished and a migration to Telegram has occurred17. Whilst 
Telegram’s suite of features is used by IS supporters to interact 
and communicate, to distribute joinlinks to other groups and 
channels and to provide instructional materials, by far the most 
common function is the distribution of core IS media and, in 
particular, other pro-IS materials (regardless of their origin)18. 
As well as “using Telegram’s file-sharing features to disseminate 
content internally, IS sympathizers on Telegram use external 
file-sharing sites to ensure IS content remains on the internet 
and resilient to takedowns”19. Dozens of unique URLs to a sin-
gle piece of pro-IS material on different file-sharing sites are 
distributed using Telegram channels and groups. The URLs are 
then shared on Twitter, Facebook, and other mainstream social 
media platforms20. This separation of the content producers, 
disseminators, and consumers from the material itself bolsters 
IS dissemination networks against the effects of takedowns by 
ensuring that, even if content is removed from one site, stable 
access exists to others21. File-sharing platforms are thus utilised 
as “communication black-boxes” to “enable the rapid redistri-
bution of content even under conditions of drastic policing 
16 Ibid.
17 M. Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of  Online Terrorist Material 
and its Impacts, VOX-Pol Network of  Excellence, 2017.
18 B. Clifford and H. Powell, Encrypted Extremism: Inside the English-Speaking Islamic 
State Ecosystem on Telegram, Washington, DC, George Washington University 
Program on Extremism, 2019.
19 Ibid., p. 24.
20 S. Macdonald, D. Grinnell, A. Kinzel, and N. Lorenzo-Dus, “Daesh, Twitter 
and the Social Media Ecosystem: A Study of  Outlinks Contained in Tweets 
Mentioning Rumiyah”, The RUSI Journal, 2019
21 S. Weirman and A. Alexander, “Hyperlinked Sympathizers: URLs and the 
Islamic State”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 18 April 2018.
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and filtering”22. The result is a “fragmentation” of IS propa-
ganda that makes these materials “less trackable by authorities” 
and results in a “relatively closed and stable digital propaganda 
ecosystem”23.
The Social Media Giants
As the previous section showed, efforts to remove online ter-
rorist content must address the whole social media ecosystem. 
This section discusses the application of the regulatory pyramid 
outlined above to the social media giants. The next sections 
then turn to smaller platforms.
Self-regulatory measures
Given the sheer volume of content posted and uploaded to 
social media every day, the use of technology to identify and 
remove terrorist content is essential. Some progress has already 
been made in this respect. Facebook utilises image matching (so 
that, if someone tries to upload a photo or video that matches 
a photo or video that has previously been identified as terror-
ist, they are prevented from doing so), language understanding 
(analysing text that has been removed for praising or support-
ing terrorist organisations in order to develop text-based signals 
that can go into machine learning algorithms to detect similar 
future posts), removing terrorist clusters (using algorithms to 
work outwards from pages, groups, posts or profiles that have 
been identified as supporting terrorism, employing signals such 
as whether an account is friends with a high number of accounts 
that have been disabled for terrorism) and tackling recidivism 
22 T.E. Mitew and A. Shehabat, “Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing 
Platforms and ISIS Content Distribution Tactics”, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 12, 
no. 1, 2018, pp. 81-99, 84, 97.
23 L. Bindner and R. Gluck, Trends in Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Shorter 
Longevity, Wider Dissemination of  Content, ICCT Perspective, International Centre 
for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 2018.
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(detecting new accounts created by repeat offenders)24.
In the first quarter of 2019, Facebook removed 6.4 million 
items of terrorist propaganda. In 2018 it removed 19 million25. 
Twitter also uses its own technology to identify accounts pro-
moting terrorism, as does YouTube26. From 1 August 2015 to 
the end of 2018, Twitter suspended a total of 1,582,026 ac-
counts for the promotion of terrorism27. From September 2018 
to March 2019, YouTube removed 149,980 videos for the pro-
motion of violence and violent extremism28. Across all three 
platforms, referrals from users, law enforcement and govern-
ments are responsible for only a small minority of suspensions 
and take-downs; the vast majority of violations are detected by 
technology29.
In addition, in order to try and prevent terrorists jumping 
from one platform to another, in 2017 Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft and Twitter founded the Global Internet Forum to 
Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). Members of the GIFCT collab-
orate to disrupt terrorist exploitation of their platforms. This 
includes a shared database of hashes (i.e. unique digital finger-
prints). When a violent terrorist image or terrorist recruitment 
video is removed from a member company’s platform, its hash 
is shared with other GIFCT members, enabling them to iden-
tify and remove it – or block it before it has even been posted. 
24 M. Bickert and B. Fishman, “Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism”, 
Facebook News, 15 June 2017 (last retrieved on 14 July 2019).
25 G. Rosen, “An Update on How We Are Doing At Enforcing Our Community 
Standards”, Facebook News, 23 May 2019 (last retrieved 14 July 2019). 
26 V. Gadde, “Key data and insights from our 14th Twitter Transparency Report”, 
Twitter Public Policy Blog, 9 May 2019 (last retrieved on 14 July 2019); S. Wojcicki, 
“Expanding our work against abuse of  our platform”, YouTube Official Blog, 4 
December 2017 (last retrieved 14 July 2019). 
27 Figures taken from Twitter’s biannual transparency reports.
28 Figures taken from the “YouTube Community Guidelines” section of  Google’s 
transparency reports, available at https://transparencyreport.google.com/you-
tube-policy/removals?hl=en (last retrieved on 14 July 2019).
29 M. Bickert, “Hard Questions: What Are We Doing to Stay Ahead of  Terrorists?”, 
Facebook News, 8 November 2018 (last retrieved on 14 July 2019); V. Gadde (2019).
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There are currently 14 GIFCT members and over 200,000 
hashes in the shared database30.
Removal orders and fines
Whilst some progress has been made, there nonetheless re-
mains a conviction that reliance on self-regulation is insuffi-
cient and that the biggest social media companies should be 
doing more31. According to the European Commission, for ex-
ample, “the scale and pace of progress among hosting service 
providers as a whole is not sufficient to adequately address this 
problem”32. This has led to the various regulatory measures and 
proposals outlined in the introduction. At the same time, how-
ever, attempts to impose sanctions on the biggest social media 
companies raise a number of difficult issues.
The use of fines and other financial penalties (whether im-
posed administratively or judicially) is an almost ubiquitous 
feature of regulatory regimes. As Germany’s NetzDG law il-
lustrates, fines may be utilised for a number of reasons. These 
include: failure to respond to a removal order within the al-
lotted timeframe; failure to comply with reporting/transparen-
cy mechanisms; and failure to ensure an effective complaints 
mechanism. In addition to the direct economic impact, the rep-
utational damage associated with a fine may provide an addi-
tional incentive for compliance33. In particular, it may affect the 
platform’s attractiveness as an advertising space, as highlighted 
by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee: 
30 See https://gifct.org/joint-tech-innovation/ (last accessed 14 July 2019).
31 See, for example, the evidence session before the UK Parliament’s Home 
Affairs Committee, at which the Chair of  the Committee stated to representa-
tives from Facebook, YouTube and Twitter: “It seems to me that time and again 
you are simply not keeping up with the scale of  the problem, the scale of  crimi-
nal and terrorist activity, and doing the things that we all, as communities across 
the world, need you to be doing” (Home Affairs Committee, “Oral evidence: 
Hate crime and its violent consequences”, HC 683 24 April 2019 Q904).
32 European Commission (2018). 
33 ICF Consulting Services Ltd, Research into Online Platforms’ Operating Models and 
Management of  Online Harms, 2019 (last retrieved on 16 July 2019). 
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When there was a social media backlash against companies 
whose adverts appeared alongside extremist videos on YouTube, 
those companies had little choice but temporarily to stop adver-
tising on YouTube. More recently, Unilever announced that it is 
considering withdrawing its business from companies that are 
not doing more to provide “responsible digital infrastructure34. 
At the same time, the imposition of fines may not be straight-
forward. For a start, a company may not be willing to pay and, 
if it is registered outside of jurisdiction and does not have any 
physical assets within jurisdiction, it may not be possible to en-
force it. In terms of the social media giants, however, this is less 
of a problem. Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter all have 
physical headquarters within the EU and, as such, member 
states may enforce fines via a system of mutual recognition35.
A more significant limitation stems from these companies’ 
sheer economic strength. Any fine may simply be absorbed as 
an additional cost of doing business. One potential solution 
here is to base the level of fines on the financial strength of the 
platform. Under the General Data Protection Regulation, for 
example, the most serious infringements may incur a fine of up 
to €20 million or 4 per cent of the company’s total worldwide 
turnover in the preceding financial year, whichever is higher36. 
In traditional business models, there is a danger that the cost 
of substantial fines will ultimately be borne by consumers. As 
one commentator has remarked, “when the corporation catches 
a cold, some else sneezes”37. However, since most social media 
34 Intelligence and Security Committee of  Parliament, The 2017 Attacks: What 
needs to change?, 2018 (last retrieved on 19 August 2019). 
35 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of  24 February 2005 on the 
application of  the principle of  mutual recognition to financial penalties.
36 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  
27 April 2016 on the protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing 
of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art.83(5). 
37 J. Coffee, “No soul to damn: no body to kick: an unscandalized inquiry into 
the problem of  corporate Punishment”, Michigan Law Review, vol. 79, no. 386, 
1980, p. 389.
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companies provide services to users free of charge, a different 
dynamic applies. Perhaps the cost of fines will be passed on to 
advertisers, which could lead to reduced investment in adver-
tising on the platform. Or perhaps the impact of a substantial 
fine will be mitigated by increasing the volume of advertising 
on the platform, which could spoil the user experience and im-
pact the number of active users. Either way, the possibility of a 
substantial fine provides an incentive to the company to ensure 
compliance with the regulatory regime in the first place.
There is also the possibility of imposing personal liability 
on senior management. Individual liability in the context of 
corporate transgressions is a growing trend38. The UK’s recent 
Online Harms white paper considers the possibility of senior 
management liability for major breaches of the proposed stat-
utory duty of care but acknowledged a number of challenges, 
including identifying the roles to which liability might attach39. 
Within the UK, the Data Protection Act 2018 permits individ-
ual liability in cases where an offence has been committed by a 
corporation with the consent or connivance of a director, man-
ager, secretary or similar officer, or is attributable to the neglect 
of one of these40. However, even if a person with a suitably sen-
ior role resides within jurisdiction, the requirement to demon-
strate consent, neglect, etc. is a potentially difficult hurdle to 
overcome. This might be particularly challenging in the case of 
social media giants with complex management structures.
Disruption of business activities and ISP blocking
In extreme cases it may be necessary to resort to the most dra-
conian enforcement options at the top of the regulatory pyra-
mid: disruption of business activities and ISP blocking. Both 
of these possibilities are considered by the UK’s Online Harms 
38 M. Nietsch, “Corporate illegal conduct and directors’ liability: an approach to 
personal accountability for violations of  corporate legal compliance”, Journal of  
Corporate Law Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 2018, pp. 151-184.
39 Above, no. 8, p. 60. 
40 Data Protection Act 2018, s.198(1). 
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white paper. The former would include requiring third parties 
to withdraw services from the transgressing company, including 
removal from search results and app stores, and the cancelation 
of a range of ancillary services such as domain name registra-
tion and payment processing. Such measures might restrict the 
future growth of platforms, although in the case of the social 
media giants – who already have extremely large numbers of 
existing registered users – the impact may be minimal.
ISP blocking represents an option of last resort and raises 
some significant issues. Social media has become an integral 
aspect of people’s everyday lives. Blocking access to the biggest 
platforms would cause public outcry and would have a signif-
icant socio-economic impact. It would also represent a prior 
restraint on speech, something which is generally seen as anti-
thetical to liberal democratic traditions41. Whilst prior restraints 
may sometimes be consistent with the European Convention 
on Human Rights42, it is questionable whether blocking an 
entire platform will be deemed proportionate when the vast 
majority of activity on the platform is lawful. There are also 
additional technological challenges, not least the ability of users 
to circumvent measures such as ISP blocking. This is a signif-
icant issue given that “we are entering an online environment 
in which the knowledge barrier for using technologies such as 
VPNs and TOR has never been lower”43. 
Smaller Companies That Lack Capacity
Governments may be less concerned about the impact of ter-
rorist content published on small- or micro-platforms because, 
by definition, such platforms have relatively limited reach. 
The NetzDG law, for example, only applies to platforms with 
41 E. Barendt, Freedom of  Speech, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
42 Observer and Guardian v UK, 14 EHRR 153, 1992.
43 CYTREC, Response to the Online Harms White Paper , 2019 (last retrieved on 16 
July 2019). 
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over two million registered users in Germany. Yet, as explained 
above, the social media giants form just one part of a wider eco-
system. It is through the exploitation of smaller platforms that 
terrorist groups have managed to bolster resilience against take-
downs and ensure stable access to their propaganda. Moreover, 
the more effective the regulation of the biggest platforms, the 
more likely terrorist migration to smaller platforms becomes. 
In terms of these smaller platforms, the challenge is often not 
a lack of willingness but a lack of capacity. A well-known exam-
ple is Justpaste.it. Justpaste.it is a free content-sharing service 
that allows content to be posted within seconds with no reg-
istration required. Owned by Mariusz Zurawek, who runs the 
site out of his home in Poland, the content posted on Justpaste.
it began to include IS propaganda in early 2014. By March 
2015, Zurawek estimated that he had removed up to 2,000 
posts at the request of London Metropolitan Police44. Since 
then he has received a large volume of take-down requests from 
all over the world. This poses challenges in terms of identifying 
what content is legal and responding to take-down requests in 
other languages, as well as capacity and resources45. So, whilst 
any potential regulatory framework ought to apply to smaller 
platforms, it must also be proportionate and mindful of such 
platforms’ relatively limited resources.
When dealing with such platforms, the central role of any 
regulator is to enable self-regulation by the provision of ad-
vice and guidance. In the UK’s Online Harms white paper, for 
example, the functions of the proposed regulator include: the 
publication of codes of practice; the establishment of a trans-
parency, trust and accountability framework; and, the provision 
44 S. Stalinsky and R. Sosnow, The Jihadi Cycle On Content-Sharing Web Services 2009-
2016 And The Case Of  Justpaste.it: Favored By ISIS, Al-Qaeda, And Other Jihadis 
For Posting Content And Sharing It On Twitter - Jihadis Move To Their Own Platforms 
(Manbar, Nashir, Alors.Ninja) But Then Return To Justpaste.it, MEMRI Inquiry & 
Analysis Series No. 1255, 6 June 2016 (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
45 Tech Against Terrorism, “UK Launch of  Tech Against Terrorism at Chatham 
House”, 12 July 2017 (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
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of support to start-ups and SMEs to help them fulfil their le-
gal obligations in a proportionate and effective manner46. One 
of the objectives of the GIFCT is also to build the capacity 
of smaller platforms by knowledge-sharing. To this end, it has 
collaborated with the U.N.-mandated Tech Against Terrorism 
initiative to launch a knowledge-sharing platform47. This offers 
various resources including a list of terrorist groups and indi-
viduals on the U.N. sanctions list, recommendations for model 
terms of service and model guidelines for transparency reports. 
Smaller platforms are also likely to have limited technolog-
ical capacity. Here, the Online Harms white paper proposes 
equipping a regulator with powers to facilitate the sharing of 
technological solutions. It offers the example of a hackathon, 
attended by leading tech firms and hosted by the UK’s Home 
Secretary and Microsoft, which commenced the development 
of a tool to identify online grooming. When complete the tool 
will be licensed free of charge to smaller and medium compa-
nies worldwide48. 
As mentioned above, GIFCT members have already col-
laborated to develop a shared hash database. Yet more could 
be done. GIFCT members are reportedly experimenting with 
URL sharing49. This is welcome, given the important role URLs 
play in propaganda dissemination strategies. Since botnets have 
also been found to play a significant role in efforts to dissem-
inate terrorist propaganda, GIFCT members should also de-
velop shared automated systems that use behavioural (as op-
posed to content-based) cues to block terrorist content (such 
as abnormal posting volume or the use of trending hashtags to 
46 Above, no. 8, para. 5.2. 
47 GIFCT, “Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism: an update on our 
efforts to use technology, support smaller companies and fund research to fight 
terrorism online”, 18 June 2018 (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
48 UK Government, “New tool developed to tackle online child grooming”, 13 
November 2018 (last retrieved on 17 July). 
49 G. Rosen, A Further Update on New Zealand Terrorist Attack..., cit.
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gain attention)50. This is important, given that many smaller 
platforms rely exclusively on humans to identify and remove 
terrorist content51. 
There is also a pressing need to expand membership of the 
GIFCT, to ensure access to such initiatives. One study found 
evidence of more than 330 different platforms being used by 
terrorist groups since 2016, with 25 of the top 50 most-used 
platforms being small- or micro-platforms52. In comparison, 
there are just fourteen GIFCT members. Many smaller plat-
forms lack the capacity required to fulfil the GIFCT member-
ship criteria. These criteria include: terms of service that include 
content standards; regular, public data transparency; a public 
commitment to human rights; and, support for civil society 
organisations challenging violent extremism53. Here, the pro-
vision of advice and guidance by a regulator, along the lines 
envisaged by the UK’s Online Harms white paper, could have 
significant value. 
Lastly, it should be noted that, whilst the role of a regulator 
in the case of smaller companies that are willing to cooperate 
would naturally be focused on interventions located at the base 
of the regulatory pyramid, a responsive approach would none-
theless require escalation to stricter interventions if self-regula-
tory strategies do not achieve the desired outcomes. Where this 
occurs, a truly responsive approach would require an element 
of proportionality, for example, by allowing a longer period to 
comply with a removal order than would be case with a social 
media giant. 
50 S. Macdonald, D. Grinnell, A. Kinzel, and N. Lorenzo-Dus, A Study of  Outlinks 
Contained in Tweets Mentioning Rumiyah, Global Research Network on Terrorism 
and Technology, Paper no. 2, 2019 (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
51 I. van der Vegt, P. Gill, P., S. Macdonald, and B. Kleinberg, Shedding Light on 
Terrorist and Extremist Content Removal, Global Research Network on Terrorism 
and Technology, Paper no. 3, 2019 (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
52 Tech Against Terrorism, “ISIS use of  smaller platforms and the DWeb to 
share terrorist content”, 29 April 2019 (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
53 See https://gifct.org/members/ (last retrieved on 15 July 2019).
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Smaller, Uncooperative Companies
As the video of the Christchurch attack illustrates, there may be 
some smaller platforms that are unwilling to remove terrorist 
content. From a regulatory perspective, these companies pose 
different challenges. There is little reason to provide advice and 
guidance on regulatory compliance if the platform in question 
does not accept the desirability of removing terrorist content 
in the first place. Facilitation strategies require a predisposition 
towards compliance and the broad objectives of the regulatory 
framework.
The use of fines in cases involving such companies may also 
be problematic. The enforcement of any financial penalties will 
depend on the nature of the jurisdiction where the platform is 
registered and senior management is domiciled. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine a scenario in which a platform is based in an 
uncooperative country and, in the absence of a reciprocal agree-
ment with that country, any fines imposed are unenforceable. 
Given the limited efficacy of traditional regulatory sanc-
tions in cases involving uncooperative platforms, another en-
forcement strategy could be to force companies that provide 
supporting services to take responsibility. ISPs could, for ex-
ample, be pressured to raise prices on such companies, provide 
them with a lower quality of service, or deny them service al-
together. Following the October 2018 Pittsburgh Synagogue 
shooting, GoDaddy refused to be further associated with the 
controversial social media platform Gab, forcing it to find an-
other domain provider54. Similarly, following the August 2019 
shooting in El Paso, Texas, Cloudflare announced that it would 
no longer offer the message board 8chan protection from dis-
tributed denial of service attacks55. Such action might cause the 
54 Far-right social network Gab goes offline after GoDaddy tells it to find anoth-
er domain registrar https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/28/far-right-social-net-
work-gab-goes-offline-after-godaddy-tells-it-to-find-another-domain-registrar/ 
(last retreived on 19 July 2019). 
55 J. Taylor and J.C. Wong, “Cloudflare cuts off  far-right message board 8chan 
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impugned company to change their behaviour or force them 
to seek another ISP, which would be a significant cost for a 
smaller company. The ultimate threat of ISP blocking should 
also remain in the regulator’s armoury as a way of incentivising 
engagement with less severe interventions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified three requirements for efforts to re-
quire social media companies to do more to remove terrorist 
content from their platforms to be effective. First, a diverse reg-
ulatory toolkit is required. The chapter has discussed a range 
of regulatory interventions, including advice and guidance, re-
moval orders and fines, and disruption of business activity and 
ISP blocking. Each of these has value in certain contexts and 
limitations in others. Second, the chapter has shown the im-
portance of responsivity to a range of factors, including: the na-
ture of the relevant platform and its position within the social 
media ecosystem; the degree of company engagement with the 
regulator; and, the extent to which the conduct of companies 
enhances or undermines the overall rationale of the framework. 
Third, to achieve this responsivity, the various interventions in 
the toolkit should be organised in a regulatory pyramid. 
Even the most carefully designed regulatory framework will 
not lead to perfect compliance. Some problems are likely to 
persist, particularly in respect of a regulatory framework that 
is limited to a single jurisdiction. Terrorist groups may migrate 
to platforms or jurisdictions which are relatively unregulated. 
Some regulatory tools, such as ISP blocking, may also be cir-
cumvented using such means as VPNs and the TOR browser, 
which enable access to platforms that are blocked in the user’s 
home country but accessible in others. The obvious solution to 
these challenges is to adopt a global approach – but obtaining 
after El Paso shooting”, The Guardian, 5 August 2019 (last aretrieved on 23 
August 2019).
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international agreement is beset with difficulties. The prospects 
for a regional approach may be more favourable; the Council 
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime has not only been rat-
ified by countries beyond Europe but has also influenced the 
design of cybercrime legislation in a number of non-signatory 
states56. Ultimately, however, the fact that a regulatory regime 
will not achieve perfect compliance is not a reason to not en-
act the regime in the first place. As Berger and Morgan state 
in their study of the disruption of IS activity on Twitter, “The 
consequences of neglecting to weed a garden are obvious, even 
though weeds will always return”57.
56 J. Clough, “A world of  difference: the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 
and the challenges of  harmonisation”, Monash University Law Review, vol. 40, no. 
3, 2014, pp. 698-736.
57 J.M. Berger and J. Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing 
the Population of  ISIS Supporters on Twitter, Analysis Paper no. 20, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC, 2015, p. 56.
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